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ABSTRACT
We consider allocation of a resource to multiple interested users
with a constraint that if the resource is allocated to user i then it
can not be allocated simultaneously to a predefined set of users𝒮i .
This scenario arises in many practical systems that include wireless
networks and constrained queuing systems. It is known that socially
optimal strategy-proof mechanism is not only NP-hard, but it is
also hard to approximate. This renders optimal policy hard to use in
practice. Here, we propose a computationally efficient mechanism
and prove it to be strategy proof. Using Monte Carlo simulations, we
show that the social utility of the proposed scheme is close to that of
the optimal. Further, we demonstrate how the proposed mechanism
can be used for fair and efficient short-term spectrum allocation in
resource constrained large wireless networks.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Optimal use of resources has always been a concern. In today’s
world with increasing demand, efficient use of limited and scarce
resource has become a challenge. A resource allocation mechanism
must be designed to meet the strategic goals of the system. The
desired strategic goals may include maximization of social welfare,
efficient and fair utilization of limited resource and maximization of
revenue. Auction based mechanism is a popular way of distributing
the available resource among users [10]. Here, it is assumed that each
user has some quantitative valuation of the usefulness of the resource
for them. Based on the valuation, users bid for the resource and the
auctioneer or centralized controller arbitrates resource distribution
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based on the received bid values. Each user is assumed to be greedy
and rational. Hence, a key challenge in using auctions for resource
distribution is that the users may not bid their true valuation if that
benefits them. Hence, key challenge in this approach is to device a
strategy-proof/truthful auction in which users do not have any incen-
tive in not bidding their true valuation [12]. Hence, being rational,
their bids would equal their respective true valuations. A well known
Vickrey Clarke Grooves (VCG) auction provides a framework for
designing strategy proof mechanism that maximizes social utility
[3, 7, 14]. However, depending on scenario under consideration
VCG may not be computationally feasible. Thus, alternative ways
are required.
In this paper, we consider a constrained resource allocation prob-
lem in which a single resource can be allocated to multiple interested
users. Users are assumed to be selfish and rational. The allocation is
constrained in a sense that corresponding to each user i, there exists
a pre-specified set of users𝒮i such that if the resource is given to
user i, then it can not be given to any user in𝒮i . This constrained
resource allocation is relevant in many applications including sched-
uling in ad-hoc networks, overlay device-to-device communication
and spectrum allocation in cellular networks. Moreover, in many of
these scenarios the resource in allocated for some time after which
the reallocation is done, e.g. a channel is allocated to non-interfering
links in wireless network for a predefined time slot and the allocation
may vary from slot to slot based on many factors including backlog,
delay, data priority and channel state. Thus, we assume that the
resource is auctioned periodically. It is known that VCG auction is
NP-hard for constrained resource allocation [5]. Thus, it can not be
used it this case as resource allocation needs to be computationally
fast for repeated execution.
In many applications for which the aforementioned constrained
auction mechanism is relevant, there are desirable features other than
maximization of social welfare for an allocation mechanism. For
example, if we consider each user i to be a Base Station (BS) in a
cellular system and𝒮i to be the set BSs that interfere with i, then
for efficient utilization of the scarce and expensive spectrum must
be ensured. Thus, the number of BSs that get the spectrum may also
be important. Also, in the case where BSs may belong to different
operators, it is possible that “small”operators may not be able to
bid comparatively with “big”operators and hence may never get the
spectrum. It may be desirable to make the auction based allocation
fair in a sense that fraction of time slots in which the BSs get the
spectrum must be balanced across the BSs. Our aim in this paper is
to propose a strategy-proof and computationally feasible auction for
resource allocation for constrained resource allocation problem. We
show that the proposed mechanism not only achieve near-optimal
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social utility but also perform well in terms of resource utilization
and fairness parameters.
Now, we state some most relevant previous work for the problem
under consideration. As stated before VCG auctions are applicable
for the problem under consideration, but it is computationally in-
feasible. To address this, computationally efficient strategy-proof
alternatives that include greedy [16] and SMALL [15] are proposed.
While SMALL has poor resource utilization, greedy suffers from un-
fair allocation when considered across time. In [17] authors propose
a double auction based spectrum allocation mechanism which holds
strategy-proof property. Authors in [6] propose spectrum allocation
mechanism for repeated auctions for maximizing the social welfare.
They also ensure fairness in spectrum allocation among the users.
Some other relevant work includes the algorithms for real time dy-
namic spectrum allocation among the base station [4, 13]. These
algorithms are not strategy-proof. Auction based general framework
for spectrum allocation in cognitive network has been proposed by
the authors in [9]. Authors in [8] propose auction based approach is
efficient for spectrum allocation among the base stations in cognitive
networks. Authors in [11] present Licensed Shared Access frame-
work for spectrum sharing between incumbent and secondary users.
This framework requires efficient mechanism to address dynamic
load variations in the network. A comprehensive overview of the
game theoretic approaches used for spectrum sharing in cognitive
radio networks is given in [8].
Our main contributions are as follows:
• We study the problem of resource allocation among multiple
users with limited constrained set, which is NP-Hard and
becomes intractable for large set of users.
• We propose truthful mechanism Group Optimal Strategy-
Proof Allocation (GOSPAL) for resource allocation in generic
framework and also present its application in resource alloca-
tion among the base stations in wireless networks.
• With simulations we demonstrate that the proposed mecha-
nism performs well in terms of achieving the social efficiency
of resource allocation close to the optimal solution. The pro-
posed mechanism is also computationally efficient, which
makes it practical feasible for implementations in the large
set of users.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes
the system model and problem formulation. In Section 3, proposed
algorithm GOSPAL is presented in detail. We demonstrate the appli-
cability of the proposed algorithm in spectrum allocation in wireless
networks in Section 4. Simulations results are presented in Section
5.In Section 6 we conclude our work.
2 SYSTEM MODEL AND PRELIMINARIES
We consider the resource allocation problem where a resource can
be allocated to the multiple users. The time is slotted, and each slot
is called allocation frame. The framework for resource allocation
comprises of a centralized controller, database and a set of users.
The database contains the information about the resource available
for allocation. The centralized controller is the key entity which per-
forms resource allocation among the users in each allocation frame.
Each user i has a constraint set𝒮i such that if resource is allocated
to user i then it can not be allocated to the users contained in the𝒮i
simultaneously. We assume that the constraints are symmetric, i.e. if
j ∈ 𝒮i then i ∈ 𝒮j . Let𝒩 = {1, 2, . . . ,n} denote the set of users.
We assume all the users, though rational, act selfishly and are non
co-operative. The following steps are repeated in every frame t :
Each user in the system has a hidden state associated with it.
Depending on its state, users make their demand valuation. Let ri (t)
denote the actual demand valuation of the user i in frame t . The
actual demand valuation is a user’s private information. Each user
i communicates bid value qi (t) to the centralized controller at the
beginning of frame t , and qi (t) need not be equal to ri (t). Based on
the bids received, the controller allocates resources while respecting
the constraints. The allocation remains for the frame duration. In
the following, we discuss resource allocation problem that needs
to be solved in every allocation frame. For brevity, we omit t from
notation.
2.1 Action Space and Action Profile
Action profile of a user is the set of all possible bids that can be
chosen by the user. Let qi denote the bid of user i. Here, a user is
free to declare any positive qi . Therefore, the action profile of user i
is qi ∈ ℛ+. In case any user has bid 0, then it is not considered for
resource allocation. Hence, without loss of generality, we assume
that all users qi > 0. Action space of the system with n users is
denoted as n-tuple, q = (q1, . . . ,qn ) comprising of the bids corre-
sponding to each user. Since action profile of each user is positive
real value, the action space of n users correspond to q ∈ ℛn+ . Also,
define the action profile q−i ∈ ℛn−1+ comprising of bids from all the
users as in q except that of user i. Next, we formulate the problem
that needs to be solved in each allocation frame.
2.2 Problem Formulation
Let x = (x1, . . . ,xn ) denote a indicator binary vector indicating
resource allocation such that xi = 1 only when the resource is
allocated to user i.
DEFINITION 1. A binary vector x is a feasible resource al-
location if xi +
∑
j ∈𝒮i x j ≤ 1 for every i ∈ 𝒩 . Moreover, if
xi +
∑
j ∈𝒮i x j = 1 for every i ∈ 𝒩 , then x is called maximal
resource allocation.
Let𝒳 denote the set of all feasible resource allocations. Next we
define auction based resource allocation mechanism.
DEFINITION 2. An auction based resource allocation policy π is
a map fromℛn+ to𝒳 ×[0,∞)n , i.e. for given bids q, π outputs feasi-
ble allocation xπ (q) and a price vector pπ (q) = (pπ1 (q), . . . ,pπn (q)).
Thus, a resource allocation policy π outputs a feasible resource
allocation for any given bid vector q, and also the price that each
user needs to pay for the allocated resource. Let Π denote the set of
all auction based allocation policies.
DEFINITION 3. Social utility under π for bid values q is defined
as U πs (q) =
∑n
i=1 rix
π
i (q). Moreover, utility for user i for bids q
under π is given asU πi (q) = (ri − pπi (q))xπi (q).
Note that the value of social utility is the sum of true evalua-
tions, not the bid values, of the users to which π allocates resources.
Moreover, utility for a user is the difference between its true evalua-
tion ri and price pi charged under policy π . Aim of the centralized
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controller is to design π that maximizes social utility, i.e. it wants
π⋆ ∈ argmax
π ∈ΠU
π
s (q), (1)
while each user wants to bid so as to maximize its own utility. Note
that r is the private information with the users, and the centralized
controller may not know it. Thus, we need to design mechanism in
which rational users have no incentive to submit bid other than its
true evaluation.
DEFINITION 4. A mechanism π is truthful (strategy-proof) if
U πi (ri ,q−i ) ≥ U πi (q), for all q ∈ ℛn+ .
Thus, for strategy-proof mechanism π , users have no incentive
to bid anything other than its true evaluation. Next, for complete-
ness sake, we describe VCG mechanism that obtains strategy proof
optimal mechanism π⋆ given in (1).
2.3 Vickrey-Clarke-Grooves (VCG) Mechanism
VCG mechanism for the specified problem is implemented in two
steps as described next. In the first step, given bid vector q, find
U⋆(q) = maxx ∈𝒳
∑n
i=1 qixi . Thus, x
⋆(q) is a resource alloca-
tion that maximizes the total bid value aggregated over all users
to which resource is allocated. In the second step, price for each
user is computed as described next. Let 𝒳−i denote the set of all
possible resource allocations over set of users 𝒩 \ {i} with no
change in the constraint sets for the considered users. LetU⋆−i (q) =
maxx ∈𝒳−i
∑
j,i qjx j . Now, price for user i is given by
pi = U
⋆
−i (q) − (U⋆(q) − qi ).
The VCG mechanism is known to be strategy proof. Hence, users
do not have any incentive to bid anything other than ri . Thus, VCG
allocation solves the desired optimization problem (1). In spite of
optimality, VCG mechanism is not practical as it is NP-hard to
compute resource allocation that achievesU⋆(q) and prices p. Thus,
finding polynomial optimal resource allocation is not feasible unless
P=NP, and hence computationally feasible sub-optimal resource
allocation strategy with desired characteristic are required. Next, we
propose one such algorithm.
3 GOSPAL ALGORITHM
In this section, we describe an efficient strategy-proof mechanism for
resource allocation. The mechanism is implemented in two phases:
(1) Resource Allocation phase and (2) Pricing phase. The resource
allocation phase arbitrates users that should get the resource. If a
user is allocated resource, how much it must to pay is decided in a
pricing phase. The design of a pricing scheme is essential to enforce
strategy-proofness (truthfulness). First, we describe the resource
allocation strategy and the pricing scheme is presented subsequently.
3.1 Resource Allocation Phase
As discussed above, the resource allocation phase determines which
users should be allocated the resource, i.e. we select x ∈ 𝒳 .
Towards this end, our first step is to randomly partition the set
of all users 𝒩 into at most η non-conflicting groups denoted as
{G1, . . . ,Gη }, where η = maxi ∈𝒩 |𝒮i | + 1. Here, |A| denotes the
cardinality of set A. The partitioning is achieved using an iterative
greedy algorithm. In first iteration a user is selected at random, and
Algorithm 1 Pseudo code for randomized conflict-free grouping
Input:𝒩 ,𝒮i for every i ∈ 𝒩
Output: A conflict-free partition {G1, . . . ,Gη }
1: Initialize𝒩temp = 𝒩 and Gu = ϕ for every u = 1, . . . ,η
2: while𝒩temp , ϕ do
3: Choose a user, say i, from𝒩temp uniformly at random
4: Find umin = min{u : u ∈ {1, . . . ,η} and Gu ∩𝒮i = ϕ}
5: Gumin ← Gumin ∪ {i}
6: end while
Algorithm 2 Pseudo code for resource allocation for given group
ordering ωj
Input: G ju for every 1 ≤ u ≤ η,𝒮i for every i ∈ 𝒩
Output: A resource allocation x(j)
1: Initialize Gtemp = ϕ, ℓ = 1 and xi (j) = 0 for all i ∈ 𝒩
2: while ℓ ≤ η do
3: Ga ← G jℓ \ (∪i ∈Gtemp𝒮i )
4: xi (j) ← 1 for every i ∈ Ga
5: Gtemp ← Gtemp ∪Ga
6: ℓ ← ℓ + 1
7: end while
it is put in group G1. In a typical iteration, a user i is picked at
random from𝒩 \ ∪ηk=1Gk and it is put in the group Gumin such that
umin = min{u : u ∈ {1, . . . ,η} and Gu ∩ 𝒮i = ϕ}. We continue
this process until ∪ηk=1Gk = 𝒩 . Pseudo code for the randomized
conflict-free grouping is provided in Algorithm 1. Following lemma
summarizes key properties of the partitioning step.
LEMMA 1. A conflict-free grouping algorithm given in Algo-
rithm 1 outputs a partition {G1, . . . ,Gη } of𝒩 such that if i, j ∈ Gu ,
then j < 𝒮i .
PROOF. We need to show that the RHS in Step 4 of the algorithm
is a non-empty set in every iteration. Rest follows immediately from
how this set is constructed. Required follows from the fact maximum
cardinality of any𝒮i is η − 1. Thus, there exist at least one u such
that Gu ∩𝒮i = ϕ. □
The Lemma 1 states that the resource can be allocated to all the
members of any groupGu without violating the allocation constraint.
Moreover, it is important to note that the grouping does not depend
on the bid values q.
Now, let Ωд denote the set of all possible orderings of the sets
{G1, . . . ,Gη } obtained using conflict-free grouping algorithm. Thus,
|Ωд | = η!. Furthermore, let ωj ∈ Ωд denote the j‘th ordering of the
groups in the set Ωд . We denote ωj by a tuple (G j1, . . . ,G jη ). For
example if η = 3, then there are |Ωд | = 3! = 6 different orderings.
One of the possible 6 group ordering or tuple is ωj = (G2, G1, G3).
Thus,G j1 = G2,G j2 = G1 andG j3 = G3. A resource allocation given
group ordering ωj is done as follows. We first assign the resource
to each user in G j1, then to all the users in G j2 \ (∪i ∈G j1𝒮i ), and
so on. Pseudo-code to obtain resource allocation corresponding to
group ordering ωj is given in Algorithm 2. Following guarantee can
be given about output of the algorithm.
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LEMMA 2. The resource allocation vector x(j) given by Al-
gorithm 2 corresponding to any group tuple ωj is feasible, i.e.
x(j) ∈ 𝒳 . Moreover, x(j) is maximal allocation vector for every j.
PROOF. Let xℓ(j) denote the allocation after ℓ iterations of the
algorithm. We first show that xℓ(j) ∈ 𝒳 for every 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ η.
Note that for ℓ = 1, xℓi = 1 only for i ∈ G j1. From Lemma 1,
x1(j) ∈ 𝒳 follows. Suppose xℓ(j) ∈ 𝒳 holds for every 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ ℓ′.
Consider (ℓ′ + 1)th iteration of the algorithm. Note that the Gtemp
in every iteration contains users to which the resource is allocated
until that iteration. Note that in Step 5 of the algorithm the resource
is allocated only to users in G j(ℓ′+1) that do not conflict with the
users in Gtemp. This proves that xℓ′+1(j) ∈ 𝒳 and the required
follows using induction. Now, we prove that the resource allocation
is maximal. Suppose not, then there exist a user u such that xℓu (j) =
0 in the output of the algorithm, but x ′ such that x ′i = xℓi (j) for
every i , u and x ′u = 1 is in𝒳 . Since, (G j1, . . . ,G jη ) is a partition
of𝒩 , u must belong to some G jℓ . Also, u must not belong to 𝒮i
for any i which is allocated the resource in first ℓ − 1 iterations
of the algorithm. But, then the algorithm will allocate resource to
user u in ℓth iteration. Hence, no such user exists. This proves the
required. □
Now define, with little abuse of notation, the perceived social
utility under allocation x(j) as
U˜j (q) =
n∑
i=1
qixi (j).
Moreover, define j⋆q = argmax{j :ωj ∈Ωд } U˜j (q). Thus, ωj⋆ is the
group permutation for which perceived utility is maximized among
all possible group permutations. We propose to choose resource
allocation x(j⋆q ). Note that even though the grouping does not depend
on the bids q, the chosen resource allocation does. Let U˜⋆(q) denote
the maximum value of the perceived social utility for the bids q.
Next, we describe our proposed pricing scheme.
3.2 Pricing Scheme
After the resource allocation, we propose the appropriate pricing
scheme which ensures the strategy-proofness of the proposed algo-
rithm. That is, if any user tries to deviate from its actual demand, it
is penalized. Let q−i (ϵ) denote the bid vector in which the bids of
all the users except i are same as that in q, but the bid of user i is
ϵ > 0 in q−i (ϵ). Now, the price charged from the user i is given as:
pi (q) =
[
lim
ϵ ↓0
U˜⋆(q−i (ϵ)) − (U˜⋆(q) − qi )
]
× xi (j⋆q ). (2)
We state the following straightforward result.
LEMMA 3. Under any bid values q > 0, 0 ≤ pi ≤ qi for every
i ∈ 𝒩 .
PROOF. Note that for every ϵ > 0,
U˜⋆(q−i (ϵ)) ≥ U˜⋆(q) − qi + ϵ .
Thus the required follows by taking limit ϵ ↓ 0 on both sides of the
above inequality. □
Algorithm 3 Pseudo code for GOSPAL mechanism
Input: bid vector q,𝒮i for every i ∈ 𝒩
Output: Resource allocation x(q) and price vector p(q)
1: Use Algorithm 1 to obtain conflict free grouping (G1, . . . ,Gη )
2: for ωj ∈ Ωд do
3: Find allocation x(j) using Algorithm 2
4: Compute U˜j (q) = ∑ni=1 qixi (j)
5: end for
6: Find j⋆q = argmax{j :ωj ∈Ωд } U˜j (q)
7: Choose x(q) = x(j⋆q )
8: Compute prices using (2)
This lemma clearly shows that for any truthful user i, utility
obtained is non-negative irrespective of the bids of other users.
Note that the optimal group permutation under bid vectors q and
q−i (ϵ) can be different. Also, note that unlike VCG, in our pricing
scheme we do not completely remove user i, rather user i is always
present. Only the bid value of user i goes to zero. This distinction is
important as removing a user changes resource allocation conflicts.
As illustration consider a system with five users with constraint sets
given by𝒮1 = {3, 4, 5},𝒮2 = ϕ,𝒮i = {1} for i = 3, 4, 5. Suppose
grouping given by Algorithm 1 is G1 = {1, 2} and G2 = {3, 4, 5}.
Consider permutation ω1 = (G1,G2). Thus, as per Algorithm 2, the
resources will be first allocated to all the users in G1 and then to the
users in G2 that do not have conflict with the users in G1. Note that
when user 1 is present in the system, resource can not be allocated
to any user in G2. But, if we remove user 1 completely, then all the
user in G2 can get the resource. Thus, there is a clear difference
under our scheme with regard to when user is present and when it is
not. It is important to note that the price in our scheme is calculated
while retaining user in the system unlike VCG. Pseudo code for the
proposed algorithm is given in Algorithm 3. Next we prove the key
properties of our proposed algorithm.
LEMMA 4. (Monotonicity) If a user i is allocated resources for
bids q, then it will also be allocated resources for bids q−i (ϵ) for
every ϵ > qi . Moreover, optimal group permutation under q and
q−i (ϵ) are the same, i.e. j⋆q = j⋆q−i (ϵ ).
PROOF. Without loss of generality, let ϵ = qi +∆ for some ∆ > 0.
Note that since the bid value of only user i has changed, we can
conclude that
U˜j (q−i (ϵ)) − U˜j (q) ≤ ∆, (3)
for every group permutation ωj . Moreover,
U˜j⋆q (q) + ∆ = U˜j⋆q (q−i (ϵ)), (4)
i.e. the perceived social utilities under group permutation j⋆q for bid
vectors q and q−i (ϵ) differ by amount ∆ with latter having the larger
value. Thus, we can conclude from (3) and (4) that j⋆q is optimal
group permutation for q−i (ϵ) as well. Now, the required follows
from Algorithm 2. □
Lemma 4 implies that if a user unilaterally increases its bid, then it
is more likely to get the resources. Next, we prove that our proposed
algorithm is strategy proof.
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THEOREM 1. Algorithm 3 is strategy-proof.
PROOF. We proof the required by considering two scenarios.
Scenario 1 : User i bids more than its true valuation, i.e. qi > ri .
Without loss of generality, qi = ri + ∆ for some ∆ > 0. Bids of the
other users can be arbitrary. Thus, we compare two bid vectors, viz.
q and q−i (ri ), where latter corresponds to user i bidding truthfully.
This scenario is further bifurcated into three cases.
Case (i): User i gets resource under both bid vectors q and q−i (ri ).
By Lemma 4, it follows that the optimal group permutation remains
same for both the bid vectors. It follows that the optimal perceived
utility values satisfy U˜⋆(q) = U˜⋆(q−i (ri )) + ∆. Now, from (2), it
follows that pi (q) = pi (q−i (ri )). Thus the required holds.
Case (ii): User i does not get the resource under q−i (ri ), but gets it
under q. Note that utility for user i under q−i (ri ) is zero as it does
not get the resource. Now, we bound user i utility under q. Since
the bid for only user i is different under two bid vectors, we can
conclude that
U˜⋆(q) − U˜⋆(q−i (ri )) ≤ ∆. (5)
Now, from (2), it follows that
pi (q) = lim
ϵ ↓0
U˜⋆(q) − (U˜⋆(q) − qi )
= lim
ϵ ↓0
U˜⋆(q) − (U˜⋆(q) − ri ) + ∆ (6)
= (U˜⋆(q−i (ri )) − U˜⋆(q)) + ri + ∆ (7)
≥ ri . (8)
Equality (6) follows as qi = ri + ∆. Equality (7) follows by
Lemma 4. Note that for every ϵ smaller than ri user i can not get
resource as it can not get it at bid value ri . Moreover, since only bid
for user i is changing, the optimal perceived social utility remains
unchanged. Hence, the limiting value equals maximum perceived
social utility for bid q−i (ri ). Finally, (8) follows from (5). Now, (8)
implies that the utility for user i under q can at most be 0, which is
same when it bids true valuation ri . This proves the required.
Case (iii): The user i neither gets resource at actual demand qi , nor
at qi + ∆. Here, utility for user i will remain zero.
Scenario 2 : User i bids less than its true valuation, i.e. qi < ri .
Without loss of generality, ri = qi + ∆ for some ∆ > 0. Bids of the
other users can be arbitrary. Thus, we compare two bid vectors, viz.
q and q−i (ri ), where latter corresponds to user i bidding truthfully.
This scenario is further bifurcated into three cases.
Case (i): The user i is allocated resource under q−i (ri ) and also
under q. Analysis of this case is similar to that in Case (i) of Sce-
nario 1. Again here, it can be shown that the utility for user remains
unchanged, and hence there is no benefit for deviating from true
evaluation.
Case (ii): The user i is allocated resource under q−i (ri ), but
it does not get it under q. This implies that the user i has utility
ri − pi (q−i (ri )) for bid vector q−i (ri ), but on deviation its utility
becomes zero. Now, the required follows from Lemma 3.
Case (iii): The user i neither gets a resource at q−i (ri ) nor at q.
Here, the utility for the user remains Thus, no incentive on deviation
from actual demand. This completes the proof. □
Computational complexity of the proposed algorithm isO((η!)2n2).
Recall that η is the maximum cardinality of the constraint sets. In
many applications, constraint set cardinality does not increase with
the number of users, e.g. cellular systems. In such systems, the
algorithm provides computationally efficient strategy-proof mech-
anism for resource allocation. In the next section, we describe the
functioning of the proposed algorithm using example.
4 ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
In this section, we describe a practical application in which the
proposed mechanism can be applied. We consider the problem of
channel (spectrum) allocation in wireless networks. Due to limited
availability of spectrum, efficient and fair allocation of spectrum
becomes essential. Spectrum allocation can be performed using
auctions. We describe application of the GOSPAL algorithm for the
channel allocation among multiple base stations using sealed bid
auctions. We consider a geographical region with n base stations
deployed to provide services to the subscribers. We assume that the
spectrum database contains information about the channel available
for allocation. Let us assume that each base station provides coverage
to the disc of radius R units centered at the base station location.
This means that, if any two base stations that are placed distance less
than R units can potentially interfere with each other whenever they
are allocated the same channel. In other words, the base stations B1
and B2 are said to be interfering pairs if the distance between them
is less than R units. Thus, in our model, base stations are the users.
For a base station i, 𝒮i is the set of all base stations that are less
than r units away from i. Note that to avoid interference, a channel
can be given to at most one user in {i} ∪𝒮i . Typically in a wireless
network, base stations are organized to cover certain geographical
area and hence |𝒮i | is expected to be small for each i.
We assume that the base stations compete for the channel. The
need for resource depends on current state at the base station. For
example, if the base station has a large backlog, or if it had to serve
time critical application, then its need for the resource is more in
order to achieve the desired quality of service. Let ri denote the true
evaluation at the base station i. To obtain the resource, base station
i submits bid qi . Depending on the bids received, the centralized
controller decides on which base stations get the channel. Channel
allocation needs to be interference free. Next, we demonstrate spec-
trum allocation in a wireless network using GOSPAL mechanism.
Illustrative Example: Consider a network consisting of 6 base
stations distributed across the region as illustrated in Figure 1. We
assume each base station submits a non-zero bid to the auctioneer.
The base stations in the wireless network are denoted as node and
the interfering pair of base stations have an edge joining them. Let
the bid vector q = [5 7 8 9 6 9]. We describe resource allocation
under three strategy-proof resource auction mechanisms, one pro-
posed here and two from the literature. Specifically, we consider
SMALL and greedy auction mechanisms proposed in [15] and [16],
respectively.
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Table 1: Base Station Grouping
Group List
G1 {1, 5}
G2 {2, 4}
G3 {3, 6}
Table 2: Group arrangements & social welfare
Sequence
No.
Group arrange-
ments
Social Wel-
fare
1 [G1, G2, G3] 20
2 [G1, G3, G2] 20
3 [G2, G1, G3] 22
4 [G2, G3, G1] 25
5 [G3, G1, G2] 22
6 [G3, G2, G1] 22
4.1 Allocation in GOSPAL
In the first step, GOSPAL partitions the set of all users into non-
conflicting groups using Algorithm 1. Let the output of Algorithm 1
be as shown in Table 1. With 3 groups, we get |Ωд | = 6 arrange-
ments. For each arrangement, we determine the social welfare U˜ (q)
based on the bids. Table 2 provides the social utility for each per-
mutation (see Algorithm 2). Note that the permutation [G2,G3,G1]
achieves the highest social utility 25. As per Algorithm 2, the re-
source allocation chosen by GOSPAL is x⋆(q) = (0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1) (see
Algorithm 3).
4.2 Allocation in SMALL
Auction mechanism SMALL also partitions the set of all users
randomly into non-conflicting groups. Without loss of generality, let
the partition be same as that shown in Table 1. SMALL determines
the group valuation σ (G j ) for each group j, where σ (G j ) = (|G j | −
1) ×min{qj |j ∈ G j }. Each user, except the one with the least bid, in
the group with maximum evaluation gets the channel. The users that
get the channel pay price equal to the least bid value in the group. In
the example considered here, G3 has the highest group evaluation of
8. Hence, only user 6 gets the channel and it pays price equal to 8.
4.3 Allocation in Greedy
The greedy scheme starts by picking a user with the highest bid
value. This user gets the channel. In the iterative step, the highest
bidding user in the set of users which are neither already selected nor
are in the constraint set of the selected users is selected. The process
continues until no user can be selected. The price for a selected user
i is calculated as follows: We remove the user i from the system.
Compute the greedy allocation for the remaining n − 1 users. Let
c be the highest bid value of of a selected user in 𝒮i in the new
allocation. Then, the price for i is c. In the example considered here,
users 6, 4 and 2 get the channel and the prices for these are 6, 8 and
5, respectively.
In the constructed example, GOSPAL and greedy have the same
social utility, while SMALL achieves much lesser value. Moreover,
GOSPAL and greedy provide maximal allocation, while SMALL has
lesser resource utilization. Though the proposed algorithm performs
on par with existing schemes in the constructed example, to under-
stand the performance comparison of these schemes we perform
Monte Carlo simulation as described in the following section.
5 SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we compare the performances of various strategy-
proof mechanisms for resource allocation. To model the resource
allocation constraints, we generate a random undirected graph G =
(V ,E) whose nodes represent users and the constraint set for user i
equals the set of neighbors in G. The random graphs are generated
with the desired degree distribution using configuration model [2].
In all our simulations, the maximum degree is restricted to 4. Perfor-
mance of the proposed scheme is compared against VCG, SMALL
and greedy schemes. Simulations are performed in MATLAB [1].
We compare the performances based on three parameters:
• Social Welfare: It is defined as the sum of the valuations of the
base stations which are assigned channels.
• Spectrum Utilization: It is defined as the total number of base
stations which are assigned channels in allocation phase.
• Fairness across time: It quantifies disparity between the average
number of times the channel is allocated to various base stations.
First, we compare the performance of the proposed mechanism,
SMALL and greedy with VCG for small graph sizes (up to 21 nodes).
At each node, bids are generated at random in the interval [5,15].
Figure 2, shows the social welfare and and the spectrum utilization
obtained under the four schemes. Note that VCG based allocation
provides better (optimal) in both respect to the ones in GOSPAL,
SMALL and greedy. However, computation of the VCG allocation
is computationally challenging task even for sparse modest size net-
work. On the other hand, GOSPAL, SMALL and greedy can be used
to provide resource allocation for large networks. Note that our pro-
posed algorithm outperforms SMALL in all the cases significantly.
More importantly, resource utilization under our scheme is much
better than both SMALL and greedy, which is close to that in VCG.
To further understand the performance of the proposed algorithm,
we perform simulations on large networks. In this case, because
of computational intractability of VCG allocation, we compare the
results of our scheme with SMALL and greedy resource allocation
mechanisms. In Figure 3, we consider networks in which degree
distribution is uniform over {1, 2, 3, 4}. The base station bids are
uniformly distributed in the interval [8, 30]. The results shown are av-
eraged over 100 different topologies with bids chosen independently
for each base station. It can be observed that greedy mechanism
provides the highest value of social welfare among all the schemes.
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Figure 2: Performance comparison for different algorithms in small network.
However, GOSPAL provides marginally better spectrum utilization.
Both these scheme significantly outperform SMALL.
Next to understand the impact of the degree distribution on the
performance of various schemes, we repeat the same experiment as
above with following probability mass functions over degree values
{1, 2, 3, 4}: (a) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4) and (b) (0.4, 0.3, 0.2, 0.1). Note that
in case (a), the network will have large number of nodes with degree
four, while in case (b) large number of nodes will have degree 1.
Figures 4 and 5 provide the results in case (a) and (b), respectively.
Note that the results follow similar pattern as that in the uniform
degree case. These experiments demonstrate that the proposed al-
gorithm though outperforms SMALL, only provides comparable
performance with respect to greedy.
When a large percentage of base stations within the network have
a high degree of conflict, both social welfare and resource utilization
are reduced. This is illustrated in Figure 4. On the other hand, as
shown in Figure 5, a reduction in the percentage of base stations with
a high degree of conflict sets, leads to improvements in the above
mentioned parameters. This reflects the fact that lesser number of
base stations are allocated channels if the constraint set𝒮i is large
and vice versa.
Next, we perform simulations to see how various algorithms
perform when the resource allocation process is repeated periodically.
For this, we generate a random network topology and keep it fixed.
In each topology we consider 100 different randomly generated bid
values. For each, we calculate the resource allocation under all the
three schemes. Let απi denote the fraction of time base station i is
allocated resource under mechanism π . Based on the vector απi we
calculate Jain’s fairness index. Jain’s fairness index is a metric used
in networking to determine the share of system resources allocated
to a user. First, we consider a case when bid values are independent
and identically distributed (iid) across users and time. The fairness
for various schemes is shown in Figures 2c, 3c, 4c, 5c. Note that
all the schemes perform similarly. Second, we consider a scenario
in which bid values are iid across time, but not across users. For
this, we initially choose a value µi uniformly distributed in interval
[8,35] for each user i. Now the bid for user i is generated in slot t as
µi +b(t) where b(t)’s are iid and uniformly distributed in the interval
[-2,1]. The fairness index for various schemes is shown in Figure 6.
In this case, GOSPAL and SMALL significantly outperform the
greedy scheme.
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we consider resource allocation problem among multi-
ple users with constrained set. We propose Grouping based Optimal
Strategy-Proof Allocation (GOSPAL) Algorithm based on the group-
ing of non-conflicting users. We prove that GOSPAL is strategy-
proof. Since the proposed algorithm is computationally efficient,
it is feasible to implement even in large number of users. Using
simulation results, we observe that GOSPAL achieves social utility
and resource utilization close to the optimal. The mechanism also
achieves better fairness index for resource allocation among the
users in comparison to the other existing scheme.
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Figure 3: Performance comparison for different algorithms in large network.
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Figure 4: Performance comparison for different algorithms with increasing probability to higher degree interfering base station.
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Figure 5: Performance comparison for different algorithms with decreasing probability to higher degree interfering base station.
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Figure 6: Comparison of fairness index for different algorithms
in large networks.
